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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/03/2004

Accident number: 273

Accident time: 10:05

Accident Date: 25/08/2000

Where it occurred: Near Restelicia, Gora,
MNB South
Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Kosovo
Secondary cause: Inadequate training (?)

Class: Handling accident

Date of main report: 17/09/2000

ID original source: KC/MD/JF

Name of source: KMACC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: Fuze

Ground condition: bushes/scrub
grass/grazing area
hard

Date record created: 18/02/2004

Date last modified: 18/02/2004

No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: DM 689 460: MGRS

Coordinates fixed by: GPS

Map east: 68954

Map north: 49047

Map scale: Restelica

Map series: M709

Map edition: 5-NIMA

Map sheet: 3178 IV

Map name: 1:50,000

Accident Notes
inadequate training (?)
metal-detector not used (?)

Accident report
A Mine Accident Report was prepared for the country MACC and made available in August
2000. The following summarises its content.
The accident occurred at a site with "several dangerous areas" recorded. The mines found
were mainly PMA-3 and PMR-2A. TMA-5 AT mines had been present but "people from
Albania" had removed most of them. Clearance work was progressing well "due to open
ground and sparse vegetation" although some of the PMA-3 mines had been "affected" by
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local people having burnt off the vegetation about three weeks previously. The ground was
described as "semi-hard" and compacted with "small bush". A photograph showed very little
ground cover and large areas of burnt ground. The weather was described as sunny with a
temperature of 25C and a light breeze.

The photograph above shows the area being worked on.
The demining group was made up of "local Kosovo Albanians" headed by a Team Leader and
Assistant who were both expatriates. The deminers worked a one man drill in two man teams
(inferred) working "for 30 minutes on and 30 minutes off". The team were last visited by a
MACC QA on the day before the accident.
The victim was an expatriate supervisor with 24 years military experience. He had been a
member of the demining group for a year and had been in Kosovo previously.
Work began at the site at 08:00. At 09:50 a deminer reported having found a PMA-3 while
prodding [no mention of detectors was made]. The victim ordered the deminers out of the field
and went to "neutralise" the mine. He removed the UPMAH initiator from the mine and noticed
that is was "slightly damaged". He carried the mine body in his right hand and the initiator in
his left hand as he walked out of the mined area. At 10.05 the detonator in the initiator
exploded in his hand.
The victim called for help and his assistant and the medic went to him. The demining group's
manager and the authorities were notified of the accident by radio.
The photograph shows the victim’s hand during treatment.

The medic examined the victim's hand and decided to evacuate him by road. The victim was
"conscious and stable the whole time". At 11:45 they reached the KFOR hospital where a
"small problem" with identity cards delayed their entry.
The investigators determined that the victim had been wearing appropriate PPE but did not
record what it was.
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Conclusion
The investigators concluded that the victim "took a risk" by carrying an initiator that he had
noticed was damaged. The demining group's SOPs state that destruction in-situ should take
place unless it proves "to be impractical". If it did prove to be impractical, the mine was to be
"remotely pulled " before handling. They said that there was no reason not to destroy the
mine in-situ. They determined that the mine casing was not damaged by fire and that the
mine had been found under the ground.

Recommendations
The investigators recommended that the demining group should produce annex documents to
their SOPs covering "each type of mine they intend to neutralise in Kosovo". When
neutralisation was done, a special box should be provided for the "fuse" to be stored in after
separation. They added, "only in exceptional cases should the PMA-3 mine be neutralised.
They have an UPMAH-3 pressure friction (chemical) fuse which is very unstable."
A final recommendation was for the MACC to address the "small inconvenience" experienced
at the KFOR base where an absence of appropriate ID cards caused a problem.
The MACC Programme Manager added a document requiring the demining group to make
the changes to their SOPs recommended in the accident report.

Victim Report
Victim number: 348

Name: Name removed

Age: 43

Gender: Male

Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 1 hour 45 minutes

Protection issued: Not recorded

Protection used: not recorded (worn)

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
minor Hand
COMMENT
No medical report was made available.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Management/control inadequacy" because
the demining group was operating in breach of their published SOPs. The victim was the most
senior manager in the field, and the responsibility for his selection and training rested with
higher management. The secondary cause is listed as “Inadequate training”.
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